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1. Introduction 
Despite  numerous  studies  focusing  on  the  degree  and  measurement  of  intergenerational 
income mobility, relatively little is known about the mechanisms that may explain differences 
in mobility across countries and over time.
1 This paper provides new evidence on the role of 
the  educational  system  for  intergenerational  mobility.  I  evaluate  an  educational  reform, 
implemented  in  Sweden  in  the  1950s  and  1960s,  which  abolished  tracking  and  extended 
compulsory education from seven to nine years.
2 The Swedish reform was part of a wave of 
compulsory-school expansions that took place in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s: several other 
countries also undertook major changes in the spirit of the Swedish reform, so the lessons 
from this particular policy intervention are relevant for many European countries.
3 
The  reform  may  have  influenced  intergenerational  mobility  by  several  different 
mechanisms.  First,  there  is  the  possibility  of  a  direct  effect  of  extending  compulsory 
education;  it  is  likely  that  children  from  poor  backgrounds  benefited  more  than  children 
growing up under more advantageous socio-economic conditions. Second, the age at which 
tracking takes place can be crucial for the educational choice. In particular, the earlier the 
tracking, the more likely it is that the schooling decision is made by the parents, based on their 
preferences for education, and not on the child’s actual ability or on his or her preferences. 
One can also assume that parents’ information on the child’s ability is noisier, the younger the 
child; parents may therefore choose according to their own preferences and not given the 
actual  ability  of  their  child.  Hence,  a  postponement  of  ability  tracking  implies  higher 
intergenerational mobility.
4 
                                                 
1 See for example Solon (1992), Björklund and Jäntti (1997) and Haider and Solon (2006).  
2 In fact, in the final 9
th grade of the new comprehensive school, pupils were divided into three different tracks. 
However, even though in different tracks, pupils were still all attending the same school establishment, which is 
strikingly different from the pre-reform tracking system where pupils were also sorted into different schools. 
3 Other countries affected by reforms are England, Finland and Norway. 
4 Ermisch et al. (2006) argue that differences in intergenerational mobility between Great Britain and Germany 
might be explained by the lower tracking age in Germany.   2 
A  third  mechanism  operates  through  assortative  mating.  Recent  studies  on 
intergenerational mobility recognize the fact that what determines an individual’s economic 
standard of living is the income of his/her family (Chadwick and Solon 2002, Blanden 2005, 
Ermisch  et  al.  2006).  Intergenerational  mobility  with  respect  to  family  income  thus 
incorporates the income of an individual’s spouse, and the degree of assortative mating in a 
society will naturally affect economic mobility. Clearly, if the degree of assortative mating is 
high,  intergenerational  mobility  will  be  lower,  whereas  if  couples  are  formed  randomly, 
mobility will be higher.
5 As suggested in Mare (1991), I argue that the school shapes the peer 
group of individuals, i.e., the peer group in which people meet and form couples. A school 
that sorts pupils early based on ability and/or family background gives rise to homogenous 
peer groups where individuals meet and mate with their own kind. Postponing tracking to 
later ages implies that the peer group is more heterogeneous and couples may be formed 
across ability and parental background. Thus, later tracking implies lower assortative mating, 
and higher intergenerational mobility. 
The Swedish school reform postponed ability tracking by three years and kept all 
pupils in one comprehensive school throughout nine years. It is possible but less likely that 
partners meet already in the last years of the nine year comprehensive school, but the reform 
may  have  affected  an  individual’s  peer  group/educational  group  later  in  life,  and  if  so, 
possibly also assortative mating. In addition, supporting the hypothesis that the reform may 
have influenced marital patterns, surveys show that a large proportion of couples actually 
meet  in  school.  Evidence  from  the  Netherlands  indicate  that  15  percent  of  the  surveyed 
couples  attended  the  same  school:  5  percent  attended  the  same  elementary  school  and  7 
percent the same secondary school (Kalmijn and Flap 2001). Similarly, U.S. figures point to 
that 23 percent of married couples met in school (Lauman et al. 1994). 
                                                 
5 Previous studies show that about 40-50 percent of the covariance between parents’ and own permanent family 
income can be attributed to assortative mating; see Ermisch, Francesconi and Siedler (2006).   3 
  The  purpose  of  the  study  is  to  evaluate  the  effects  of  the  Swedish  compulsory 
school  reform  on  intergenerational  mobility,  and  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  the  effect 
operates through assortative mating. A better understanding of the mechanisms underlying 
intergenerational mobility is important for the design of educational policies. In particular, if 
ability sorting has quantitatively large effects on mating patterns, then we might take this as 
evidence of the importance of sorting of individuals on different characteristics in general. 
Holding the age of ability tracking constant, the organization of schools, that is, how pupils 
are sorted within the school, may influence intergenerational mobility in itself. 
  The  compulsory  school  reform  was  implemented  gradually  across  the  country’s 
around 1000 municipalities, starting in 1948. Thus, for a given birth cohort, some individuals 
went through the old school system and others went in the new comprehensive school. The 
nature  of  the  implementation  allows  me  to  adopt  a  differences-in-differences  approach  to 
evaluate  the  effects  of  the  reform  on  intergenerational  income  elasticities,  both  for  own 
income (a direct effect) and spouse’s income (the assortative-mating effect) with respect to 
own parents’ permanent family income. Given that the rich data at my disposal also include 
biological  siblings,  I  test  the  robustness  of  my  results  by  adopting  a  sibling-difference 
approach. Identification is in this case obtained by the fact that siblings who grow up in the 
same  municipality  might  be  subject  to  different  educational  systems;  the  younger  sibling 
naturally the one being affected by the educational reform. This empirical approach controls 
for family background shared by siblings, which is particularly important in the case where 
the educational reform is not exogenous with respect to municipality or family characteristics. 
  I use a unique set of data compiled from Swedish administrative records that links 
generations and siblings, and that contains detailed earnings-histories for all individuals. My 
main finding is that the reform led to sizeable increases in intergenerational income mobility, 
i.e., it reduced the intergenerational income elasticities between children and parents. The   4 
evidence concerning the impact on assortative mating is not as clear, however. The analysis 
shows that the reform reduced marital sorting for only for men, not for women, but this did 
not translate into higher mobility when taking partner’s income into account. 
  The  paper  unfolds  as  follows:  section  2  presents  previous  literature,  section  3 
describes  the  Swedish  educational  reform,  section  4  presents  a  simple  model  of 
intergenerational mobility and assortative mating, and also the empirical specification, section 
5 focuses on the data and section 6 presents the results. Finally, section 7 offers conclusions. 
 
2. Previous Literature 
This paper contributes by combining two branches of the literature on economic mobility: the 
first one has its focus on the role of the education system for intergenerational mobility, 
whereas  the  second  one  devotes  attention  to  the  importance  of  assortative  mating  for 
economic  persistence  across  generations.  There  has  been  a  recent  upsurge  of  empirical 
evidence  on  the  role  of  the  education  system  in  the  mobility  process.  For  example,  the 
Swedish compulsory school reform and its long-run consequences for inequality have been 
studied previously by Erikson (1996) and Meghir and Palme (2005). Erikson’s study relates 
changes over time in inequality of educational opportunity to several factors, one of which is 
the educational reform. He finds that the introduction of the nine year comprehensive school 
coincided in time with reduced inequality in education. Meghir and Palme find that the reform 
increased  education  and  earnings  for  those  individuals  that  were  directly  affected  by  the 
reform. In particular, the reform significantly increased earnings for those with low educated 
fathers, and high-ability individuals, also with low-skilled fathers, attained levels of education 
higher  than  the  new  compulsory  minimum.  This  is  an  indication  that  intergenerational 
mobility was affected by the introduction of the reform, and serves as a benchmark to the 
results  offered  by  this  study,  which  (unlike  Meghir  and  Palme  2005)  estimates   5 
intergenerational  income  elasticities  and  introduces  the  possibility  of  reform  effects  on 
assortative mating. 
The  evidence  is  not  limited  to  the  Swedish  case,  however.  Riphahn  and  Bauer 
(2005)  study  the  timing  of  ability  tracking  and  its  consequences  for  intergenerational 
educational  mobility,  taking  advantage  of  regional  variation  in  the  age  of  tracking  across 
Swiss cantons. They find that the impact of parental education on the education of the child 
varies with the age of tracking, in such a way that later tracking increases intergenerational 
mobility. Pekkarinen et al. (2006) make use of an educational reform in Finland, similar to the 
Swedish  reform,  to  assess  the  effects  on  intergenerational  income  correlations  of  a 
postponement  of  ability  tracking.  They  find  that  the  reform  reduced  the  intergenerational 
income  correlation  with  seven  percentage  points,  which  corresponds  to  20  percent  of  the 
correlation of 0.32. Their empirical approach is similar to the one in this paper, but they do 
not take into consideration the effects operating through changes in assortative mating. 
A number of studies also use cross-country differences in the educational system in 
order  to  say  something  about  its  role  for  mobility.  For  example,  Ammermueller  (2005), 
Brunello and Checchi (2006), and Schuetz et al. (2005) all focus on how the coefficient of 
parental  background  on  children’s  outcomes  varies  with  different  tracking  regimes.  Their 
findings  are  somewhat  contradictory,  but  all  point  in  the  direction  of  early  tracking 
reinforcing the role of parental background in determining children’s outcomes. Furthermore, 
Hanushek and Woessman (2005) focus on the effect of ability sorting on inequality. Adopting 
a cross-country differences-in-differences strategy, their main finding is that early tracking 
increases  inequality  in  achievement.
6 And  finally,  the  previous  literature  also  provides 
evidence from interventions at later stages of education: Machin (2005) studies changes over 
time in intergenerational mobility in Britain, and links it to changes in the educational system. 
                                                 
6 Further evidence on tracking is found in Dustmann (2004) and Restuccia and Urrutia (2004).   6 
Comparing two birth cohorts, born in 1958 and 1970, he finds that mobility has fallen, mainly 
due to the fact that the expansion of post-secondary education has benefited children from 
advantaged backgrounds more than children from low-income families. 
  Turning  to  the  literature  on  marital  sorting  and  mobility,  it  is  clear  that  if  we 
measure the individual’s economic status with family income instead of own income, the 
higher the degree of positive assortative mating, the lower is the intergenerational mobility. In 
two  early  studies,  Lam  and  Schoeni  (1993,  1994)  find  strong  effects  of  the  schooling  of 
father-in-law on own wages. Chadwick and Solon (2002) estimate permanent family income 
elasticities  for daughters and sons, and find that income elasticities with respect to parents-in-
law are similar in size to those with respect to own parents, which confirms that assortative 
mating contributes to intergenerational persistence. Hirvonen (2006) replicates Chadwick and 
Solon’s  study  on  Swedish  data,  and  finds  lower  income  elasticities  than  in  the  US,  but 
likewise  that  assortative  mating  contributes  to  intergenerational  immobility,  more  so  for 
daughters than for sons. The latter result is also confirmed in Blanden’s (2005) results for 
Canada.  Ermisch,  Francesconi  and  Siedler  (2006)  also  find  that  assortative  mating  is 
contributing  to  immobility  in  income.  Using  German  and  British  data,  they  estimate  that 
around  40-50  percent  of  the  intergenerational  mobility  estimate  can  be  accounted  for  by 
assortative mating.  
 
3. The Swedish Compulsory School Reform 
Prior to the school reform, compulsory education mounted to seven (or in some cases eight) 
years of education. Ability tracking started in the 5
th grade, with a five year junior-secondary 
school (realskola) following, or in the 7
th grade, with a three or four year junior-secondary 
school following. Those pupils who did not select into junior-secondary school remained in 
the basic comprehensive school (folkskola) until the 7
th or 8
th grade. Importantly, the two   7 
parallel school systems were entirely separated; the pupils spent their school days in different 
establishments and could not interact during school hours. 
  In  1950,  the  Swedish  parliament  committed  to  the  introduction  of  a  nine-year 
comprehensive school, and approved of the idea of an experimental period preceding the final 
implementation  of  the  reform.  The  National  Board  of  Education  (Skolöverstyrelsen) 
administered the reform. The purpose of the reform was to increase compulsory education and 
equality  of  opportunity,  but  also  to  meet  the  increasing  demand  for  junior-secondary 
education throughout the country. At the outset of the experimental period, municipalities 
willing  to  participate  were  selected  on  several  criteria,  one  being  that  the  chosen 
municipalities should form a group representing the country in terms of both size and urban 
development. Other aspects considered were the availability of teachers and the local demand 
for education. During the course of the  experimental period,  each  year a number of new 
municipalities introduced the new school system. In 1962, the parliament came to a final 
decision to permanently introduce the nine-year school throughout the country. At this point, 
the implementation came to be a matter for each municipality; by 1969 they were obliged to 
have the new comprehensive school running. The reform was introduced either in 1st and 5th 
grade,  or  in  all  grades  1  through  5.  Pupils  in  grade  6  or  higher  in  the  first  year  of 
implementation were not subject to any changes.  
As  already  mentioned,  the  educational  reform  was  implemented  gradually  at 
different  times  in  different  municipalities  (or  sometimes  parts  of  municipalities). 
Implementation of the new comprehensive school started first in the school year 1949/1950, 
introduced a nine-year comprehensive school, and postponed tracking until the final 9
th grade 
of school. In 9
th grade, pupils were sorted into three different tracks: one vocational, one 
theoretical preparing for upper-secondary school, and a third general track.
7 However, the 9
th 
                                                 
7 In a later curriculum from 1969, tracking in 9
th grade was abolished; from now on pupils went through the 
whole comprehensive school without ability sorting.   8 
grade tracking took place within the school, and did not separate pupils into different schools 
in different neighbourhoods as did the ability tracking in the earlier school system. The reform 
also revised the curriculum; one major change was to introduce English in 5
th grade; one year 
earlier than before. For a more extensive overview of the educational reform and the Swedish 
school system, see the National Board of Ecucation (1960) and Marklund (1980, 1981). 
 
4.  The  Educational  System  and  Intergenerational  Mobility:  Model  and  Econometric 
Framework 
4.1 The Model 
In the following, I present a model of intergenerational mobility and assortative mating that 
combines the modelling approaches found in Solon (2004) and Ermisch, Francesconi and 
Siedler (2006). These models are both in the spirit of the Becker and Tomes model of parental 
investment in their child’s human capital (Becker and Tomes 1979, 1986). In particular, my 
contribution lies in incorporating the role of assortative mating (as suggested by Ermisch, 
Francesconi and Siedler (2006)), into the Solon (2004) approach, which shows that public 
investments in education can affect intergenerational income mobility. The model is stylized 
and involves a few simplifying assumptions in order to derive equations that are estimated 
empirically. The model shows how intergenerational mobility is affected by changes in the 
educational system – both through direct effects and through assortative mating. A main idea 
is that the peer group of an individual, containing potential marriage partners, can be affected 
by the educational system.
8 
The conceptual framework is as follows: Parents care about their own consumption, 
( 1 − t C ), and about the expected future economic status of their (only) child, which is captured 
by the sum of the log permanent income of the child and his or her partner, ) log (log
P
t t y y E + , 
                                                 
8 Note also, that the model does not incorporate the direct effect of ability tracking and its consequences for 
intergenerational mobility. In the model, tracking only has an effect through mating.   9 
where t indicates the generation and P denotes the partner.
9 The child’s human capital,  t h , is 
determined  by  public  investment,  1 t H − ,  as  well  as  by  the  parents’  own  investment,  1 t I − , 
according the function  
  ) log( 1 1 − − + = t t t I H h θ ,   0 > θ         (1) 
where the functional form implies positive but decreasing marginal product of investing in 
human capital (see Solon 2004). For simplicity, and unlike in Solon (2004), the child’s human 
capital is only determined by investments, and not influenced by other factors such as nature 
or role models. 
  I define assortative mating in terms of human capital. Given that parents care about 
their child’s income as well as the income of the spouse, they are sensitive to the degree of 
assortative mating in society. Parents are uncertain about the human capital of the future 
spouse of their child, 
P
t h , but know that matching of partners takes place according to the 
following matching process (assuming positive assortative mating): 
  ( ) (1 )
P P
t t t E h h h α α = + − ,  (0,1) α ∈        (2) 
where  ( )
P
t E h  is  the  expected  level  of  human  capital  of  a  prospective  partner.  With 
probability α  the child will meet someone with human capital equal to his or her own level, 
and with probability (1 ) α −  the child will meet a randomly drawn partner from the peer group, 
where the peer group mean of human capital is 
P
t h . The parameter α  will therefore represent 
the degree of assortative mating. Mating on human capital here refers to completed human 
capital, not necessarily to human capital at the time of mating. 
  Consider now the parents’ maximization problem. Permanent income of the child is 
increasing in human capital (at the same rate for both spouses): 
                                                 
9 Parent’s utility, including the sum of the log of child’s and child’s partner’s income, indicates altruism towards 
the partner, and that parents care about the partner’s income per se. It is important to them not only to maximize 
total family income, but that both spouses have high earnings.   10 





t h y 1 0 log γ γ + =             (4) 
Parents choose the optimal investment in their child’s human capital, t I , in order to maximize 
the utility function 
  [ ] ) log( ) 1 ( ) log (log 1 − − + + = t
P
t t C b y y E b U ,  (0,1) b∈    (5) 
where b indicates the relative preference for future earnings of the child and his/her partner 
compared to the parents’ own consumption. Parents maximize their utility while recognizing 
equations  (1)  --  (4)  and  the  budget  constraint 1 1 1 − − − + = t t t I C y .  The  optimal  parental 
investment in the child’s human capital is obtained as: 
  1 1 1 1
1
1
(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) 1






  = + − −     + + −  
    (6) 
As is clear from (6), parental investment is increasing in parents’ relative preference for their 
child’s future economic status b , in the assortative mating parameter α , and in the return to 
human capital investments  1 θγ . Clearly, holding public investment constant, higher-income 
families invest more in their child’s human capital. The term  1 (1 ) t b H − − −  in (6) represents a 
negative  compensation  effect:  parents  internalize  the  positive  effect  of  higher  public 
investment and reduce their investment accordingly. The stronger their preference for own 
consumption  is,  the  more  they  reduce  their  investment  in  the  child’s  human  capital  as  a 
response to higher public investment. 
  Using equations (1)-(4) and the optimal investment as in (6), the permanent income 
expressions of the child and his or her spouse are obtained as: 
  ( ) 0 1 1 1 1 log log log t t t y y H γ γ θ π γ θ − − = + + +       (7) 
  ( ) 0 1 1 1 1 1 log (1 ) log log
P P
t t t t y h y H γ γ α αγ θ π αγ θ − − = + − + + +   (8)   11 
where  [ ] [ ] 1 1 (1 ) / (1 ) 1 b b b π γ θ α γ θ α ≡ + + + − .  It  is  clear  that  public  investment  in  human 
capital affects intergenerational mobility positively. In other words, the larger is  1 t H − , the 
smaller  the  intergenerational  elasticity  1 log / log t t d y d y −  as  well  as  the  elasticity 
corresponding to the partner,  1 log / log
P
t t d y d y − . 
10 
  I  make  two  further  assumptions  in  order  to  derive  explicit  expressions  for  the 
intergenerational  elasticities  and  make  the  model  tractable  for  empirical  implementation. 










σ ϕ ,  (0,1) σ ∈        (9) 
where  the  parameter σ  describes  the  rate  at  which  public  investment  relative  to  parental 
income is decreasing in parental income. The more positive is σ , the larger the effect of the 
policy on the income of children from low-income parents compared to its effect for children 
from high-income families. The parameter thus captures the degree of “progressivity” of the 
educational policy. The second assumption is that the ratio  1 1 / t t H y − −  is “small” so that we 
can invoke the approximation ( ) 1 1 1 1 log 1 / / t t t t H y H y − − − − + ≈ .
11 Armed with these assumptions 
we can rewrite the income expressions for the child as follows: 
 
*
0 1 1 log (1 )log t t y y γ γ θ σ − ≅ + −         (10) 
                                                 
10  The  intergenerational  elasticity  pertaining  to  the  child  can  be  written  as 
( ) 1 1 1 1 log / log / 1 / t t t t d y d y H y γ θ − − − = + ,  whereas  the  analogous  elasticity  for  the  partner  is 
( ) 1 1 1 1 log / log / 1 /
P
t t t t d y d y H y αγ θ − − − = + . The intuition explaining why a larger public investment reduces the 
intergenerational elasticity is that it affects children from low-income households more than children from high-
income  families.    The  latter  group  obtain  the  desired  (high)  level  of  education  (with  or  without  public 
investment) through private investment, whereas the former is always on the compulsory minimum. Therefore, 
an extension of compulsory education will affect the length of poor children’s education, but not necessarily 
children  from  higher-income  families,  since  their  optimum  is  beyond  both  the  old  and  new  compulsory 
minimum. 
11 The assumption that the ratio  1 1 / − − t t y H  should be small can be interpreted in the following way: the public 
investment in a child’s education should be small compared to the parents’ lifetime earnings.   12 
where 
*




0 1 1 log (1 )log
P P




P γ = 0 1 1 1 (1 ) log
P
t h γ γ α αγ θ π αγ θϕ + − + + . The stylized model has thus established 
an intergenerational link between parents and their child, and also arrived at equations that are 
commonly  estimated  in  the  empirical  intergenerational  income  mobility  literature.  The 
intergenerational elasticity measures, expressed in terms of the structural parameters of the 
model, show that intergenerational income mobility (defined as  ) 1 ( 1 1 σ θ γ − − ) is decreasing 
in the returns to human capital  θ γ1 , and increasing in the progressivity of public investments 
in  children’s  human  capital,  σ .  The  elasticity  with  respect  to  parents-in-law  depends 
positively on the degree of assortative mating, α ; if mating is random ( 0 = α ), the incomes 
of the partner and the parents will be uncorrelated. 
  Finally, it should be noted that the educational system and assortative mating enter 
the child’s income equation not only through the interaction with parental income, but also 
through a direct effect on income (see ϕ  and α  in the intercept terms of equations (10) and 
(11)). Assortative mating enters directly since it affects parents’ optimal investment in their 
child’s human capital. 
 
4.2 Interpreting the Model: The Swedish Compulsory School Reform 
The Swedish compulsory school reform increased mandatory education from seven to nine 
years, and postponed tracking, keeping a heterogeneous group of pupils together for three 
more years. In the light of the above model, the extension of compulsory education can be 
interpreted as an increase in the public investment in children’s human capital. Increasing 
compulsory  education  implies  a  more  progressive  policy,  meaning  that σ  increases  and   13 
society becomes more mobile across generations. That is, the first implication of the model is 
that the educational reform should lower the intergenerational elasticity. 
  Second, postponing ability tracking has important implications for the child’s peer 
group, which after the introduction of the reform will be more mixed with respect to both 
ability and parental background. I assume that before the reform was in place, there is perfect 
sorting,  1 α = , which implies that  ( )
P
t t E h h = . With certainty, individuals will meet and mate 
with their own kind. Introducing the reform, the probability of mating with someone with the 
same human capital goes down,  1 α < . That is, a more heterogeneous peer group implies a 
lower degree of assortative mating. The second implication of the model is therefore that the 
reform  should  reduce  assortative  mating,  and  thereby  increase  mobility  with  respect  to 
parents-in-law by two  mechanisms. The first one is the same as above; the reform has a 
stronger impact on children from low-income families. However, this effect is now filtered 
through  the  strength  of  assortative  mating,  so  that  if  assortative  mating  is  lower,  the 
intergenerational elasticity is lowered even further. 
Just to be clear, it is not necessary that mating takes place at the time the reform is 
in effect; as long as the peer group is affected, the reform may have impacts on assortative 
mating. Nevertheless, there is evidence supporting that couples may form at an early age. In 
the 1949 birth cohort, around 15 percent of Swedish women were cohabiting at age 18. At age 
20, 40 percent of the women and 20 percent of the men were cohabiting (Statistics Sweden 
1995). Also keep in mind that if postponing tracking in itself results in more social mobility, 
future peer groups in later stages of the educational system will presumably also be more 
heterogeneous, with possible implications for assortative mating. 
 
 
   14 
4.3 Empirical Specifications 
The gradual implementation of the educational reform allows the estimation of a differences-
in-differences model where the log income of the child and the log income of the partner of 
the child are regressed (in two separate regressions) on log family income of the parents. The 
effects  of  the  reform  on  mobility  are  represented  in  the  following  baseline  reduced-form 
specifications:
12 
icm t icfm t m icfm t f icfm t c
m f c cm icfm t cm icfm t icfm t
e y z y x y v
z x v R y R y y
, , 1 , 1 , 1
, 1 3 2 , 1 1 0 ,
) log * ( ) log * ( ) log * (
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(12) 
where  icfm t y , log  represents the log of permanent income for individual i, belonging to cohort c, 
with a father born in year f, going to school in municipality m. Index t indicates the generation 
to  which  the  individual  belongs:  t  is  the  child  generation  and  t-1  represents  the  parental 
generation.  cm R  is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if in cohort c, municipality m, 
the reform was in effect.  icfm t y , 1 log −  represents the log of permanent parental family income, 
c v  and  m z  capture  cohort  and  municipality  effects,  respectively.  f x  stands  for  birth  year 
effects  of  the  father.  Allowing  for  a  full  set  of  interactions  with  parental  income,  the 
intergenerational  income  elasticity  is  allowed  to  vary  by  cohort  (both  the  child’s  and  the 
father’s) and municipality. However, the model does not capture municipality-specific trends 
in  the  elasticity  estimate.  The  reduced-form  coefficients  and  the  structural  parameters  are 
related as follows:  ) 1 ( *
1 3 1 σ θ γ β β − = +
cm R . 
  The  corresponding  equation  for  the  partner,  describing  the  intergenerational 
relationship with respect to parents-in-law is given by: 
icm t icfm t m icfm t f icfm t c
m f c cm icfm t cm icfm t
P
icm t
e y z y x y v
z x v R y R y y
, , 1 , 1 , 1
, 1 3 2 , 1 1 0 ,
) log * ( ) log * ( ) log * (
) * (log log log
+ Λ + Γ + Φ +
+ Ψ + Ω + Π + + + + =
− − −
− − δ δ δ δ
(13) 
                                                 
12 The intergenerational elasticity, i.e., the coefficient of a regression of the child’s log permanent income on the 
log permanent income of the parent, is identical to the correlation coefficient between the two in the case log 
incomes of parents and their children have the same variance.    15 
where 
P
icm t y , log  is the log of permanent income of the partner of individual i. The coefficients 
in equation (13) can be written in terms of their structural counterparts in the following way: 
) 1 ( * 1 3 1 σ θ αγ δ δ − = + cm R . From this equality it is clear that with the empirical specification 
(13), the reform effect on the partner-parent elasticity may be affected independently by both 
changes in i) α  (assortative mating) and ii) changes in the educational system,σ .
13 The first 
mechanism is just a consequence of a more heterogeneous peer group, holding constant other 
changes. The second mechanism reflects that the pool of partners of an individual is also 
affected by changes in the education system, and therefore, by the strength of assortative 
mating, the actual spouse may also have been affected by the reform. Equation (13) does not 
separate the two mechanisms; in fact, an important aspect of the empirical specification is that 
the partner’s individual characteristics are taken as endogenous with respect to the educational 
reform.  That  is,  equation  (13)  contains  no  controls  for  the  partner’s  age  or  own  reform 
participation. The motivation behind this approach is that if assortative mating is affected by 
reform, be it by reducing the amount of sorting on age, income or home municipality, this is 
part of the effect that I want to capture. However, in order to determine whether potential 
effects are capturing changes in partner sorting, or whether they are purely driven by the fact 
that spouse’s may also have been affected by the reform, I also present results controlling for 
the reform status of the spouse. Holding this variable constant enables me to isolate the effect 
of  a  child’s  reform  participation,  operating  through  changes  in  assortative  mating,  on  the 
economic association between his/her partner and parents.  
  In addition to the differences-in-differences result, I also present sibling-difference 
estimates, in order to control for all unobserved family background characteristics that are 
shared by the siblings. In this case, the effect of the educational reform on intergenerational 
                                                 
13 As argued in Lefgren and McIntyre (2006), changes in schooling laws will change the schooling of everybody 
in the marriage market, so that it is problematic to use them when studying the effects of education on marriage 
outcomes.   16 
mobility is identified by making use of the fact that within a family, siblings of different ages 
went  through  different  school  systems.  Within  a  sibling-pair  where  the  siblings  went  to 
different types of schools, naturally it is always the younger one that was affected by the 
implementation of the new compulsory school. Using the sibling-difference approach is an 
appealing extension of my analysis; to the extent that the reform is not exogenous across 
municipalities, it is likely to be so within a family. This particular application of the sibling-
difference  technique  is  convincing;  the  variation  within  a  sibling  pair  is  imposed  from 
changes on municipality level, and is unlikely to be endogenous within the family.
14 One 
assumption  has  to  be  maintained  however:  parents  should  not  change  the  allocation  of 
resources or the time investments in the child not affected by the reform, for compensatory or 
other reasons. One potential parental response to the reform could be to move to a different 
municipality,  but  by  restricting  the  sample  only  to  siblings  who  grew  up  in  the  same 
municipality, I rule out this source of bias. It should also be noted that sibling-estimates refer 
to the specific population of siblings, which might be different from the population as a whole. 
Note that since younger siblings are the ones affected by the reform, any reform 
estimates could be spuriously driven by birth order effects. Therefore birth order dummies are 




5. The Data 
The data used in this study are collected from registers administered by Statistics Sweden. 
First, I start out with a 35 percent random sample of each cohort born in Sweden in 1943-
1955. Those cohorts were affected by the educational reform, and to those I am also able to 
                                                 
14 Holmlund  (2005)  shows  that  heterogeneity  within  the  family  can  indeed  bias  sibling  estimates,  in  an 
application of the consequences of teenage motherhood. Within a sibling pair, it is not random who becomes a 
teen mother, but a reform imposed by the school system will be. 
15  Lindahl (2002) shows that the intergenerational income elasticity decreases with birth order for a given family 
size.   17 
assign a reform indicator stating whether the individual was subject to the reform or not.
16 By 
means of population registers, parents, siblings and children of the individuals in the random 
sample have been matched to the data. In addition, for all individuals in the data, information 
from the bi-decennial censuses, in the years 1960 to 1990, has been collected. The censuses 
provide information on which individuals that reside together, on municipality of residence, 
and on parental background of the 1943-1955 cohorts. 
  For  the  sampled  individuals,  I  also  use  the  education  register  in  1990,  which 
contains information on each individual’s highest educational degree.
17 And importantly, the 
data contain earnings histories for all individuals in the sample, starting in the year 1968. 
Income is measured as the sum of labour earnings, taxable transfers and capital income. For 
the  cohorts  born  1943-1955  (the  child  generation  in  this  study),  permanent  income  is 
measured as the mean of log total income in 1987, 1990, 1993 and 1996. That is, I use income 
observations when the individuals are in the age range 32-53 years old. In this age range, the 
observed income should properly represent the long-run income, at least for men (see Haider 
and Solon (2006) for US and Böhlmark and Lindquist (2006) for Swedish results on biases in 
estimates of lifetime income). All incomes are measured in 1990 prices and incomes below 
10,000 SEK have been dropped.
18 
  Permanent  income  of  the  parents  of  the  1943–1955  cohorts  is  measured  as  the 
average of log family income in the years 1968, 1969 and 1970.
19 This implies that I observe 
the parents’ income for the first time when the children are 13 to 25 years of age. For the 
                                                 
16 Appendix A provides an extensive description of the coding of the educational reform, and its quantitative 
development. 
17 The information on levels of schooling in the 1990 education register is translated into years of education in 
the following way: 7 years for the old compulsory school, 9 years for the new compulsory school, 9.5 years for 
the old junior-secondary school, 11 years for short upper-secondary school, 12 years for long upper-secondary 
school, 14 years for short university, 15.5 years for long university and 19 years for a doctoral degree. Parental 
education level is found in the 1970 census and translated into years in a corresponding way. 
18 Excluding incomes below 10,000 SEK implies that the permanent income measure is based on an average of 
those income observations >=10,000. An individual is dropped from the sample only if income is below 10,000 
in all four years (1987, 1990, 1993 and 1996). 
19 Family income is defined as the sum of mother’s and father’s total income.   18 
older cohorts, this income measure might not reflect the economic status of the family as they 
grew up.
20 More worrisome however, is that for the older cohorts in the sample, it is likely 
that their parents are too old for the income measure to be a good proxy for their permanent 
incomes. Observations for parents older than 55 in 1970 are dropped, which might lead to a 
non-representative sample since individuals with old parents are more likely to be excluded 
from the sample. Also for parents, family incomes below 10,000 SEK (in 1990 prices) have 
been excluded. 
  In  Table  B1  (Appendix  B),  I  provide  descriptive  statistics  for  a  non-restrictive 
sample (including individuals whose parents’ income is missing or has been excluded due to 
sample restrictions), compared to the samples used for estimation. The table shows that the 
individuals remaining in the sample used for estimation of income elasticities are somewhat 
younger,  and  with  younger  parents,  but  that  income  is  the  same  as  in  the  non-restrictive 
sample. Although the samples seem similar on average, it is clear that the sample restrictions 
imposed reduce the number of observations by a great amount, from 203000 observations to 
around 125000 observations. The loss is mainly due to the restriction on parental age: parents 
are not allowed to be older than 55 in 1970 when their income is observed. This means that of 
individuals belonging to the oldest cohort in the sample (born in 1943), only those whose 
parents were 27 years or younger at childbirth, are included in the sample. Unfortunately, the 
need to impose restrictions on the sample gives rise to a trade-off between a representative 
sample on the one hand, and measuring permanent parental income without error on the other. 
By  allowing  for  observations  where  parental  age  is  allowed  to  be  as  high  as  60  when 
observing income in 1970 reduces the loss of observations to around 45000, but most likely 
increases the error in the measure of permanent parental income, since the income is observed 
at  the  end  of  parents’  career  or  even  after  retirement.  Given  that  there  are  no  striking 
                                                 
20 Ideally, I would have liked to observe parental income when the children in this study were younger. The 
reason this is not possible is that the administrative income registers start in 1968.   19 
differences between the restrictive and non-restrictive samples in Table B1, in the paper I 
choose to present results where the cut-off of parental age is set at 55 in 1970. Raising this 
cut-off up to 60 gives results in line with those found in the paper, and can be obtained from 
the author upon request. 
  The data do not contain direct information on the spouse of the individuals in the 
sample. However, it is possible to match spouses by means of the population censuses.
21 An 
individual’s partner is in this study defined as the partner with which the individual lives 
shortly after the birth of his/her first-born child. Only individuals with a partner are part of the 
sample and it is not possible to observe marital status (although I use both the terms partner 
and  spouse  interchangeably  in  the  paper).  Since  long-lasting  consensual  unions  are  very 
common in Sweden, cohabiting couples should preferably be included in the analysis even in 
the presence of information on marital status, whereby the lack of this information is less of a 
problem. But a number of questions arise with respect to the sample restrictions. First, the 
main intergenerational estimates presented in this paper refer to individuals with children. 
(For the elasticity between individuals and their parents, estimates on a less restrictive sample 
including all individuals, also those without children and spouses, are presented in Appendix 
B). And second, when considering the results relating to assortative mating, couples without 
children  are  not  included  in  the  sample.  These  restrictions  are  to  be  kept  in  mind  when 
interpreting the results. However, when studying assortative mating, one has to settle for a 
definition of what constitutes a couple, and in absence of data on all partners (both marital and 
cohabiting), the partner at childbirth seems to be a second-best alternative. It is also reassuring 
that fertility outcomes were not affected by the reform (results for fertility are not presented in 
                                                 
21 In order to do so, I first find the first-born child of an individual.  In the first census after the child was born, I 
find the two household adults, one of which I will know is the biological parent. The other household adult is 
most likely also the biological parent of the child (or a new partner after separation), and thus the spouse of the 
individual. In some cases, the age difference between the spouses is unreasonably large, indicating that the 
household member is not a partner but more likely some other family member. I restrict partners so that the age 
difference between the two is maximum 10 years.   20 
the paper), and therefore on mating, as defined in this study.
22 The economic outcome of the 
spouses is measured in 1987, 1990, 1993 and 1996, without considering whether couples had 
separated at that time. 
  For the purposes of this study, I compile two samples of data. One is the random 
sample, which includes the sampled individuals of the 1943-1955 cohorts. The other sample is 
a sibling sample, which singles out the individuals from the random sample who have siblings 
born in 1943-1955, and matches them with their siblings. 
  Finally, Appendix A explains how I assign a reform indicator to each individual, 
and Figure A1 describes the quantitative development of the reform, by birth cohort.  As 
further explained in the appendix, I am not able to assign to all individuals in the data the 
correct information on whether they went to the old school system, or whether they were 
affected by the reform. Those individuals are also excluded from my sample. 
 
6. Findings 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the random sample and the sibling sample. Log of 
parents’ family income (in 1990 prices) is in general higher than the log of the child’s income, 
which reflects that parental income is the sum of both parents’ income. In the random sample 
(panel A), about 48 percent of the individuals were affected by the compulsory schooling 
reform. The siblings in panel B are somewhat older and therefore also a lower share went to 




                                                 
22 The fact that I observe couples shortly after childbirth also has the advantage of not introducing a bias due to 
subsequent divorce. Divorce in itself has important implications for economic well-being, but is not within the 
scope of this study.   21 
6.2 Reform Effects on Assortative Mating 
I start out by presenting reduced-form estimates of the structural parameter α  (educational 
assortative  mating),  as  described  in  section  4.  The  purpose  is  to  illustrate  one  of  the 
parameters of the simple model lined out in section 4, and to obtain an idea of the degree to 
which assortative mating might influence intergenerational mobility. Moreover, I examine the 
impact of the educational reform on the degree of assortative mating.
23  In order to find an 
estimate of educational sorting for the cohorts in my sample, I regress the child’s partner’s 
education on the child’s own education, and to estimate reform effects on this association, I 
include an interaction term between the reform and the child’s own schooling. 
Since the reform introduced a shift in the lower tail of the education distribution, 
reform estimates based on years of schooling will be plagued by this “mechanic” change in 
the distribution. Instead, Table 2 reports estimates based on a dummy variable that takes the 
value one for two years of upper-secondary school or more.
24 This measure of schooling is 
not affected by changes in the distribution of education, and enables the isolation of reform 
effects only due to changes in educational sorting.  
Turning to the results, Table 2 presents estimates of educational assortative mating, 
using a differences-in-differences specification.
25 Comparing the educational associations for 
women and men (column 1, panels A and B), some interesting differences between the sexes 
emerge. If a woman has 11 or more years of education, the probability that her partner also 
has 11 or more years of schooling increases by 0.25. For men, the corresponding increase in 
the  probability  is  0.19.  This  result  indicates  that  moving  up  the  educational  distribution, 
women are more likely than men to find an equally educated partner -- a finding mirroring 
                                                 
23 Assortative mating is widely studied in the sociological literature. For example, Mare (1991) studies trends in 
educational assortative mating in the US. For Sweden, Henz and Jonsson  (2003) find that assortative mating has 
decreased over time.  
24 Two years of upper-secondary school corresponds to a vocational degree: two additional years of education 
after completion of compulsory school in the post-reform school system. 
25 Note that the regressions include cohort effects and municipality effects for the child, and in columns 3 and 6 
also a full set of interactions between child’s education and the other controls.   22 
that traditionally it has been more socially accepted for men than for women to find a partner 
from a lower social class. 
Column  3  in  Table  2  presents  coefficients  from  the  interaction  between  reform 
participation and the child’s own education. The purpose of this estimate is to investigate 
whether  the  association  between  partners’  education  has  been  reduced  by  the  educational 
reform, as suggested in the theoretical section of the paper. The results show that for women 
subject  to  the  new  school  system,  there  is  no  effect  on  their  mating  patterns.  For  men, 
however, participating in the new comprehensive school, where tracking was postponed and a 
more heterogeneous peer group was created, indeed seems to have reduced marital sorting. 
Going through the new school system reduces the predicted probability that a man with 11+ 
years finds a partner with 11+ years of schooling by 0.029, which corresponds to 16 percent 
of the baseline probability of 0.185. This result is also robust to the inclusion of controls for 
the partner’s reform participation as shown in columns 4 and 5. 
Moving to Table 3, reporting the corresponding sibling-difference estimates, the 
higher educational association for women compared to men is confirmed, although the levels 
are lower than those of Table 2. More importantly, it is clear that the previous finding that the 
reform reduces marital sorting for men is not robust to the sibling specification. Therefore I 
conclude that there is an indication that the educational reform had an impact on marital 
sorting for men, but the finding is not robust and should be interpreted with caution. 
 
6.3 Reform Effects on Intergenerational Income Mobility 
I  now  turn  to  the  estimation  of  reform  effects  on  intergenerational  economic  mobility.  I 
estimate intergenerational elasticities of the child’s (and the partner’s) log permanent income 
on parental log permanent family income, and evaluate whether reform participation had an 
impact on the income elasticity between child and parents.   23 
Table  4  reports  on  the  differences-in-differences  results.  Panel  A  shows  the 
coefficients  from  a  pooled  sample  of  women  and  men,  whereas  panels  B  and  C  present 
separate estimates by gender. I find intergenerational elasticities of 0.14 for women and 0.21 
for  men  (column  1).
26 This  indicates  that  women  are  more  mobile  than  men,  a  finding 
confirmed in Hirvonen (2006). Turning to the intergenerational elasticities with respect to 
parents-in-law (column 4), I find that women and their spouses have elasticities similar in 
magnitude (both around 0.14) with respect to women’s parental family income. Strikingly 
different are the results for men, in panel C of Table 4. Men exhibit much higher elasticities 
with respect to their parents’ income than do their partners (0.21 vs. 0.09). Once again, this 
finding  is  in  line  with  Hirvonen  (2006),  and  is  also  an  indicator  that  women  are  more 
economically mobile than men.  
Next, column 2 of Table 4 reports on the main earnings effect of the education 
reform.  When  pooling  men  and  women  together,  I  find  that  the  reform  did  not  increase 
earnings on  average: the reform is estimated to increase  earnings by  0.1 percent, but the 
estimate is far from significant (a point estimate of 0.001 with a standard error of 0.004). As 
an interesting benchmark, Meghir and Palme (2005) estimate the average earnings gain from 
the reform to be 1.42 percent (a point estimate of 0.0142 with a standard error of 0.0089).
27 
Comparing  these  two  results,  it  is  clear  that  this  study  contributes  by  providing  a  rather 
precisely  estimated  effect  around  zero.  Reassuringly,  the  corresponding  reform  effects 
adopting  a  sibling  difference,  reported  in  Table  5,  confirm  the  differences-in-differences 
finding. 
                                                 
26 These estimates are in line with those found in Österberg (2000), but in general lower than what is usually 
found for Sweden (Björklund and Jäntti 1997, Hirvonen 2006). A possible explanation to low elasticities is 
found  in  Grawe  (2006);  the  older  is  the  parent  when  his/her  income  is  observed,  the  lower  is  the 
intergenerational elasticity. The reason is that as parents get older, the variance in their permanent earnings is 
increasing, and thus a lower coefficient will explain the same outcome. 
27 Note that the specifications and the birth cohorts differ between the Meghir and Palme (2005) study and this 
study.   24 
Establishing that the reform had no average effect on individual earnings, I now 
turn  to  the  main  analysis  of  interest:  did  the  educational  reform  have  an  effect  on 
intergenerational  income  mobility,  and  did  changes  in  educational  sorting  translate  into 
increased economic mobility when considering also the spouse’s contribution to household 
income? Column 3 in Table 4 presents the reform effects on the intergenerational elasticities 
between child and parent (corresponding to equation 12), and indeed the intergenerational 
income  elasticity  is  lower  for  those  individuals  who  were  affected  by  the  new  education 
system.  Participation  in  the  reform  reduces  the  elasticity  by  0.021,  which  represents  12 
percent of the baseline elasticity of 0.17. Moving down the table, it is also clear that the 
increase in mobility is present for both men and women, although not statistically significant 
when splitting the sample. As an alternative identification strategy, Table 5 summarizes the 
corresponding  findings  using  a  sibling-difference  approach.  When  using  within-family 
variation in reform participation, the results indicate that mobility has increased in particular 
for men: panel C of Table 5 shows that the intergenerational income elasticity was reduced by 
0.058 for men in the reform school.  
Summarizing the findings so far, it is clear that even though the average earnings 
effect is zero, the reform has reduced the economic persistence between parents and their 
children, and this result is especially robust for men. (This result is confirmed also by the 
results  in  Tables  B2  and  B3,  where  the  results  for  a  non-restrictive  sample  including 
individuals  also  without  children  and  partner  are  presented).  I  now  turn  to  examine  an 
alternative mechanism through which mobility might have been affected: did the reform have 
an impact on the elasticity of income between the partner and the parents of an individual, 
estimated as in equation 13? Columns 6 and 8 in Table 4 and Table 5 provide an answer: 
when a child is affected by a change in the peer group implied by the educational reform, it 
does not translate into choosing partners that are economically less associated with the child’s   25 
parents. The differences-in-differences estimates are all negative as expected, but statistically 




6.4 Heterogeneity in the response to the reform 
Given that there is no average earnings gain from attending the reform school, but that income 
mobility was affected, it is obvious that there is heterogeneity in the response to the reform. In 
order to examine what is underlying the changes in intergenerational income mobility, Table 
6 and 7 present estimates of the effect of the reform on income at different quartiles of the 
parental income distribution. The first three panels of each table show the effects on child’s 
income and the last three panels present the results for spouse’s income. First, focusing on the 
reform effects on the child’s own income, it turns out that most of them are insignificant, but 
an interesting general pattern of differences at different quartiles of parental income emerge. 
First, the reform actually reduced earnings for individuals from high-income families. This 
effect is statistically significant and large, in particular for women, who subject to the reform 
earn 2.2 percent less (Table 6). The sibling-difference estimates in Table 7 point to positive 
effects at the low end of the parental income distribution, and negative effects at the top of the 
distribution, although the effects are not statistically significant. Reconciling these estimates 
with the reform effects on the intergenerational income elasticites, it is clear that the reduction 
in the intergenerational elasticity is driven by mobility at both ends of the parental income 
distribution. This finding is also in line with that of Meghir and Palme (2005), who find 
negative earnings effects for individuals with high skilled fathers, and with the results for 
                                                 
28 Columns 7 and 8 include controls also for the reform participation of the spouse, in order to isolate only the 
effect on the elasticity that operates through changes in assortative mating. 
29 The results laid out in Table 4 allows for a structural identification of the assortative mating parameter α  as 

















. Using the parameter values in columns 3 and 6, 
Table 4, I find that assortative mating for women has increased with the reform, from 1.42 to 1.56. For men, on 
the other hand, the degree of assortative mating has decreased, from 0.24 to 0.17. Although I do not present 
standard errors of the change based on this approach, the reduced sorting for men is in line with the findings in 
Table 2.   26 
Finland showing negative reform effects for children from the high end of the parental income 
distribution (Pekkarinen et al. 2006). Surprising as it may be to find negative effects of the 
reform under study, it is worth noting that at the time the new comprehensive school was 
introduced it was commonly perceived that it did not meet the standards of the selective 
junior-secondary school which it replaced. The reform thus seems to have lowered the quality 
of  education  for  those  individuals  who  in  its  absence  would  have  continued  beyond 
compulsory levels. 
  The three lower panels of Tables 6 and 7 focus on the reform effects operating 
through assortative mating. The results in Tables 4 and 5 did not support the hypothesis that 
mobility  was  affected  through  mating,  but  studying  the  effect  of  the  reform  on  spouse’s 
income at different parts of the parental income distribution might reveal some interesting 
heterogeneity in the response to the reform. Recalling that the estimates in section 6.2 indicate 
that the reform reduced marital sorting for men but not for women, one should expect to find 
a reduced partner-parent elasticity for men only. Although the average reform effects on the 
partner-parent relationships are insignificant, panels E and F of Table 6 give some support 
that for men who attended the reform school mobility increased also through choice of partner, 
whereas women were not affected in this way. Men whose parents belong to the third income 
quartile (see Table 6) have responded to the reform by finding a partner with lower income 
(this result is robust to controlling for partner’s own reform status – see Table B4 in Appendix 
B).  However,  this  finding  is  not  confirmed  by  the  sibling-difference  results  in  Table  7. 
Therefore, the overall conclusion is that the reform indeed reduced intergenerational earnings 
persistence,  but  mainly  through  effects  on  the  individual’s  own  income  and  not  through 
changes in assortative mating. 
 
   27 
6.5 Remarks on the robustness of results 
A major concern when evaluating policy changes such as the Swedish educational reform is 
that the policy change is endogenous. In the case of this paper it translates into the risk that a 
correlation between the reform and income mobility is driving the results. Note, however, that 
the  differences-in-differences  estimates  include  municipality  fixed  effects,  so  that  any 
correlation between time-invariant municipality-specific factors and the reform are controlled 
for.  Furthermore,  the  inclusion  of  interactions  between  municipality  and  parental  income, 
allow for differential mobility across reform and non-reform municipalities. The empirical 
strategy does not control for differential trends in mobility across municipalities, but luckily 
the sibling-difference method is in itself a robustness check: assuming that parents treat their 
children in a similar way and do not reallocate resources as a consequence of the reform, the 
identification  implies  that  the  reform  is  uncorrelated  with  background  characteristics  and 
trends. 
  A second source of bias could be that families respond to the introduction of the 
reform by moving to a different municipality. It has been documented that children from 
higher  socio-economic  background  were  sometimes  placed  with  a  relative  in  another 
municipality in order to avoid the new comprehensive school, since it was thought to be of 
lower  quality  than  the  junior-secondary  school  (Marklund  1981).  The  sibling-difference 
analysis  conditions  on  that  siblings  grew  up  in  the  same  municipality,  and  as  long  as 
children’s  mobility  is  captured  in  a  correct  way  in  the  censuses,  the  sibling-difference 
estimates are robust to mobility caused by the reform. 
  Finally, one concern may be that the result that women are more mobile than men is 
purely driven by the fact that women’s labour supply varies more than men’s. However, by 
measuring  income  as  the  mean  over  several  years,  the  risk  that  the  estimated  mobility   28 
coefficient  is  reflecting  labour-supply  effects  should  be  reduced,  and  I  should  be  more 
confident that I have a good measure of the woman’s lifetime earnings. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This  paper  explores  the  educational  system  as  a  mechanism  explaining  intergenerational 
mobility.  Studying  the  Swedish  school  reform  that  in  the  1950s  extended  compulsory 
education  and  postponed  ability  tracking,  both  a  differences-in-differences  and  a  sibling-
difference specification find that the reform had no average effect on individual earnings; an 
effect that is precisely estimated around zero. Nevertheless, I find a sizable increase in income 
mobility as a result of the reform. The intergenerational income elasticity was reduced by 12 
percent, the result being more robust for men than for women. A policy that targeted the 
lower  end  of  the  educational  distribution  clearly  had  the  implication  to  increase 
intergenerational mobility. And interestingly, the reason the average income effect sums to 
zero is that the positive gains for individuals from poor backgrounds are counteracted by 
negative reform effects for individuals from more well-off families. 
  The paper also considers the fact that the economic standard of living is determined 
by  the  household,  meaning  that  the  economic  position  of  one’s  partner  is  an  important 
parameter  of  economic  well-being.  Assortative  mating  is  thus  a  contributor  to 
intergenerational income persistence – if people were to mate randomly, intergenerational 
mobility with respect to family income would be higher. I argue that mating takes place in the 
peer group, which can be affected by the educational system. The educational reform under 
study in this paper changed the peer group of the individual; the postponement of tracking had 
the consequence of keeping a more heterogeneous group of pupils together for a longer time. 
This might have resulted in a reduction in assortative mating.   29 
The  empirical  results  concerning  reform  effects  on  mating  patterns  are  mixed, 
however; the analysis shows that the reform likely reduced educational sorting for men, but 
there is only very weak evidence that this translated into lower partner’s earnings. Although 
this finding is not robust, I suggest it as a first indicative result of the importance of peer 
group composition for mating patterns, and hopefully future research will return to this topic. 
Overall, my findings indicate that the reform was successful in one of its purposes, 
namely  to  increase  equality  of  opportunity,  and  therefore  I  conclude  that  the  educational 
system indeed plays a major role in shaping social mobility.    30 
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Table 1                
Descriptive statistics for the random sample and the sibling sample 
 
  All    Women    Men 
  (1)    (2)    (3) 
Variable  Mean (St. Dev)    Mean (St. Dev)    Mean (St. Dev) 
A. The random sample                
Child’s log income  11.85    11.62    12.09 
  (0.48)    (0.42)    (0.42) 
Parents’ log family income  12.12    12.11    12.13 
  (0.49)    (0.49)    (0.49) 
Log partner's income  11.84    12.09    11.59 
  (0.49)    (0.43)    (0.42) 
Reform  0.48    0.49    0.48 
  (0.50)    (0.50)    (0.50) 
Reform of partner  0.46    0.31    0.61 
  (0.50)    (0.46)    (0.49) 
Child >10 years of edu  0.75    0.78    0.73 
  (0.43)    (0.42)    (0.45) 
Partner >10 years of edu  0.74    0.70    0.79 
  (0.44)    (0.46)    (0.41) 
Child’s year of birth  1950.15    1950.18    1950.13 
  (3.48)    (3.50)    (3.46) 
Father's year of birth  1921.88    1921.89    1921.88 
  (4.66)    (4.67)    (4.64) 
Woman  0.50    1.00    0.00 
  (0.50)    (0.00)    (0.00) 
n  124996    63091    61905 
           
B. The sibling sample           
Child’s log income  11.85    11.62    12.07 
  (0.47)    (0.41)    (0.41) 
Parents’ log family income  12.07    12.05    12.06 
  (0.49)    (0.49)    (0.50) 
Log partner's income  11.83    12.08    11.57 
  (0.49)    (0.42)    (0.42) 
Reform  0.41    0.41    0.40 
  (0.49)    (0.49)    (0.49) 
Reform of partner  0.41    0.26    0.56 
  (0.49)    (0.44)    (0.50) 
Child >10 years of edu  0.72    0.74    0.68 
  (0.45)    (0.44)    (0.47) 
Partner >10 years of edu  0.72    0.66    0.77 
  (0.45)    (0.47)    (0.42) 
Child’s year of birth  1949.65    1949.65    1949.55 
  (3.44)    (3.45)    (3.45) 
Father's year of birth  1920.95    1920.87    1920.86 
  (4.13)    (4.10)    (4.09) 
Woman  0.50    1.00    0.00 
  (0.50)    (0.00)    (0.00) 
n  110907    32315    32782 
Note: Income is expressed in 1990 prices.   34 
Table 2             
Assortative mating on education 
Differences-in-differences estimates 
Dependent variable: Indicator for partner having >10 years of education (vocational upper-secondary school or 
higher) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
  A. Women 
           
Child >10 years of edu  0.252  0.252  0.320  0.248  0.321 
  (0.005)**  (0.005)**  (0.023)**  (0.005)**  (0.023)** 
Reform    0.004  0.001  -0.004  -0.008 
    (0.007)  (0.016)  (0.007)  (0.016) 
R* Child >10 years of edu      0.004    0.005 
      (0.017)    (0.017) 
Reform of partner        Yes  Yes 
           
Observations  63091  63091  63091  63091  63091 
R-squared  0.10  0.10  0.12  0.11  0.12 
           
  B. Men 
           
Child >10 years of edu  0.185  0.185  0.210  0.186  0.216 
  (0.004)**  (0.004)**  (0.023)**  (0.004)**  (0.023)** 
Reform    -0.000  0.022  -0.002  0.020 
    (0.006)  (0.013)+  (0.006)  (0.013) 
R* Child >10 years of edu      -0.029    -0.028 
      (0.015)+    (0.015)+ 
Reform of partner        Yes  Yes 
           
Observations  61905  61905  61905  61905  61905 
R-squared  0.08  0.08  0.10  0.08  0.10 
           
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on municipality. 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
R denotes reform status. 
All estimates include child cohort effects and municipality effects, columns 3 and 5 also include a full set of interactions 
between child’s education and the cohort and municipality effects. Column 5 also includes the interaction between child’s 
education and partner’s reform. 
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Table 3 
Assortative mating on education 
Sibling-difference estimates 
Dependent variable: Indicator for partner having >10 years of education (vocational upper-secondary school or 
higher) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
  A. Women 
           
Child >10 years of edu  0.155  0.155  0.231  0.153  0.232 
  (0.013)**  (0.013)**  (0.050)**  (0.013)**  (0.050)** 
Reform    0.016  0.019  0.008  0.010 
    (0.015)  (0.030)  (0.015)  (0.030) 
R* Child >10 years of edu      -0.001    -0.000 
      (0.032)    (0.032) 
Reform of partner        Yes  Yes 
           
Observations  32315  32315  32315  32315  32315 
R-squared  0.56  0.56  0.56  0.56  0.56 
   
  B. Men 
           
Child >10 years of edu  0.097  0.097  0.102  0.097  0.103 
  (0.012)**  (0.012)**  (0.046)*  (0.012)**  (0.046)* 
Reform    -0.001  0.006  -0.003  -0.003 
    (0.014)  (0.025)  (0.014)  (0.025) 
R* Child >10 years of edu      -0.008    -0.007 
      (0.027)    (0.027) 
Reform of partner        Yes  Yes 
           
Observations  32782  32782  32782  32782  32782 
R-squared  0.53  0.53  0.53  0.53  0.53 
     
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on family. 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
R denotes reform status. 
All estimates include child cohort effects, birth order dummies and family-fixed effects effects, columns 3 and 
5 also include a full set of interactions between child’s education and the cohort and municipality effects. 
Column 5 includes the interaction between partner’s reform and child’s education.  
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Table 4 
Intergenerational income elasticities 
Differences-in-differences estimates 
 
                 
Dependent variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
























                 
Independent variable                 
  A. All 
                 
Parents’ log family income  0.171  0.171  0.214  0.114  0.114  0.119  0.114  0.121 
  (0.003)**  (0.003)**  (0.022)**  (0.003)**  (0.003)**  (0.019)**  (0.003)**  (0.020)** 
Reform    0.001  0.255    -0.004  0.136  -0.004  0.128 
    (0.004)  (0.117)*    (0.004)  (0.113)  (0.004)  (0.111) 
Reform*Family income      -0.021      -0.012    -0.011 
      (0.010)*      (0.009)    (0.009) 
Partner’s reform              Yes  Yes 
                 
Observations  124996  124996  124996  124996  124996  124996  124996  124996 
R-squared  0.29  0.29  0.30  0.30  0.30  0.31  0.30  0.31 
                 
  B. Women 
                 
Parents’ log family income  0.135  0.135  0.175  0.141  0.141  0.248  0.140  0.252 
  (0.004)**  (0.004)**  (0.026)**  (0.006)**  (0.006)**  (0.025)**  (0.006)**  (0.025)** 
Reform    -0.003  0.242    -0.000  0.073  -0.004  0.053 
    (0.006)  (0.174)    (0.006)  (0.169)  (0.006)  (0.166) 
Reform*Family income      -0.020      -0.006    -0.005 
      (0.014)      (0.014)    (0.014) 
Partner’s reform              Yes  Yes 
                 
Observations  63091  63091  63091  63091  63091  63091  63091  63091 
R-squared  0.07  0.07  0.09  0.07  0.07  0.08  0.07  0.08 
                 
  C. Men               
                 
Parents’ log family income  0.207  0.207  0.177  0.088  0.088  0.042  0.087  0.043 
  (0.006)**  (0.006)**  (0.035)**  (0.005)**  (0.005)**  (0.027)  (0.005)**  (0.028) 
Reform    0.005  0.259    -0.008  0.170  -0.006  0.156 
    (0.006)  (0.164)    (0.006)  (0.153)  (0.006)  (0.154) 
Reform*Family income      -0.021      -0.015    -0.013 
      (0.013)      (0.013)    (0.013) 
Partner’s reform              Yes  Yes 
                 
Observations  61905  61905  61905  61905  61905  61905  61905  61905 
R-squared  0.10  0.10  0.12  0.07  0.07  0.09  0.07  0.09 
                 
Notes: Log income for child and partner is a measure of permanent income; the average of log income in 1987, 1990, 1993 and 1996. 
Parent’s log family income is the average of the log of family income in the years 1968, 1969 and 1970. Family income is defined as 
the sum of mother’s and father’s income. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on municipality. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  
All estimates include child cohort effects, father cohort effects and municipality effects. In columns 3, 6 and 8 all controls are 
interacted with parents’ log family income. The upper panel also controls for gender. 
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Table 5 
Intergenerational income elasticities 
Sibling-difference estimates 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 


















             
             
Independent variable             
  A. All 
             
Reform  0.002  0.323  -0.003  -0.047  -0.002  -0.056 
  (0.007)  (0.188)+  (0.007)  (0.197)  (0.007)  (0.197) 
Reform*Family income    -0.027    0.004    0.004 
    (0.016)+    (0.016)    (0.016) 
Reform of partner          Yes  Yes 
             
Observations  110907  110907  110907  110907  110907  110907 
R-squared  0.66  0.66  0.64  0.64  0.64  0.64 
         
  B. Women 
             
Reform  -0.000  0.223  0.013  -0.180  0.012  -0.164 
  (0.013)  (0.361)  (0.014)  (0.376)  (0.014)  (0.376) 
Reform*Family income    -0.018    0.016    0.015 
    (0.030)    (0.031)    (0.031) 
Reform of partner          Yes  Yes 
             
Observations  32315  32315  32315  32315  32315  32315 
R-squared  0.58  0.58  0.55  0.55  0.55  0.55 
         
  C. Men 
             
Reform  -0.002  0.700  -0.014  -0.035  -0.013  -0.071 
  (0.012)  (0.331)*  (0.014)  (0.368)  (0.014)  (0.367) 
Reform*Family income    -0.058    0.002    0.005 
    (0.028)*    (0.030)    (0.030) 
Reform of partner          Yes  Yes 
             
Observations  32782  32782  32782  32782  32782  32782 
R-squared  0.63  0.63  0.54  0.54  0.54  0.54 
             
Notes: Log income for child and partner is a measure of permanent income; the average of log income in 
1987, 1990, 1993 and 1996. Parent’s log family income is the average of the log of family income in the 
years 1968, 1969 and 1970. Family income is defined as the sum of mother’s and father’s income.  
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on family. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%.  
All estimates include child cohort effects, birth order effects and family fixed effects. In columns 2, 4 and 6 
cohort and birth order effects are interacted with parents’ log income. In column 6, partner’s reform is also 
interacted with parental income. The upper panel controls for gender. 
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Table 6 
The effect of the reform at different quartiles of parental income 
Differences-in-differences estimates 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  1
st quartile  2
nd quartile  3
rd quartile  4
th quartile 
       
Independent variable  A. Dependent variable: Child’s log income - all 
         
Reform  0.007  0.003  0.012  -0.016 
  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)+ 
         
Observations  31249  31249  31249  31249 
R-squared  0.25  0.30  0.30  0.29 
         
  B. Child’s log income - women 
         
Reform  -0.003  0.007  0.011  -0.022 
  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.013)+ 
         
Observations  15773  15773  15773  15772 
R-squared  0.10  0.10  0.08  0.10 
         
  C. Child’s log income – men 
         
Reform  0.013  -0.000  0.012  -0.008 
  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.014) 
         
Observations  15477  15476  15476  15476 
R-squared  0.09  0.08  0.08  0.09 
         
  D. Partner’s log income - all 
         
Reform  -0.001  0.003  -0.010  -0.007 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009) 
         
Observations  31249  31249  31249  31249 
R-squared  0.30  0.32  0.32  0.30 
         
  E. Partner’s log income - women 
         
Reform  -0.006  0.010  0.005  -0.009 
  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.015) 
         
Observations  15773  15773  15773  15772 
R-squared  0.08  0.09  0.08  0.08 
         
  F. Partner’s log income - men 
         
Reform  0.006  -0.011  -0.022  -0.000 
  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.011)*  (0.011) 
         
Observations  15477  15476  15476  15476 
R-squared  0.11  0.10  0.11  0.09 
         
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on municipality. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%. All estimates include child cohort effects, father cohort effects and municipality effects. 
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Table 7 
The effect of the reform at different quartiles of parental income 
Sibling-difference estimates 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  1
st quartile  2
nd quartile  3
rd quartile  4
th quartile 
       
Independent variable  A. Dependent variable: Child’s log income - all 
         
Reform  0.016  0.019  -0.010  -0.012 
  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.015) 
         
Observations  27729  27726  27727  27725 
R-squared  0.60  0.64  0.66  0.68 
         
  B. Child’s log income - women 
         
Reform  0.016  0.018  -0.020  -0.008 
  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.028) 
         
Observations  8080  8078  8080  8077 
R-squared  0.56  0.55  0.57  0.60 
         
  C. Child’s log income – men 
         
Reform  0.020  0.019  -0.013  -0.034 
  (0.025)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.027) 
         
Observations  8196  8196  8195  8195 
R-squared  0.59  0.58  0.59  0.65 
         
  D. Partner’s log income - all 
         
Reform  0.001  -0.011  -0.000  0.001 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.016) 
         
Observations  27729  27726  27727  27725 
R-squared  0.62  0.62  0.63  0.65 
         
  E. Partner’s log income - women 
         
Reform  0.012  0.022  0.008  0.013 
  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.031) 
         
Observations  8080  8078  8080  8077 
R-squared  0.51  0.52  0.52  0.58 
         
  F. Partner’s log income - men 
         
Reform  -0.018  -0.029  0.012  -0.016 
  (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.028) 
         
Observations  8196  8196  8195  8195 
R-squared  0.53  0.51  0.54  0.55 
         
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on family. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant 
at 1%. All estimates include child cohort effects, birth order effects and family fixed effects.   40 
Appendix A 
 
The Educational Reform – Coding and Quantitative Development 
The first cohort affected by the educational reform was the cohort born in 1938. For cohorts 
born before 1943 it is not possible to identify the reform status of individuals, whereby I am 
obliged to drop these cohorts. The reason it is not possible to identify the reform status of the 
pre-1943 cohorts is the following: I assign reform status based on home municipality in the 
1960 or 1965 censuses (when the individuals are 10-17  years old), and based on  year of 
birth.
30 Observing the pre-1943 cohorts in the census of 1960 is too late – individuals might 
have left home for work or studies, so they might not be assigned to the right municipality. 
Another potential alternative would be to assign individuals based on their municipality of 
birth. To obtain information on municipality of birth, it is possible to use parish of birth and 
then map that to the respective municipalities. However, pre-1947, parish of birth states the 
parish of the hospital where the individual was born, which can be different from the parish 
where the individual lived.  
  After concluding that for pre-1943 cohorts it is a difficult task to assign the reform 
based on municipality and year of birth, I now turn to the coding of the reform. The coding is 
not straightforward, mainly for two reasons. First, the documentation on the implementation is 
scarce, and second, the reform was in some cases implemented in parts of municipalities at 
different  points  in  time,  which  introduces  error  when  assigning  the  reform  based  on 
municipality. 
  I use four sources to obtain a reliable coding of the reform implementation. The first 
two  are  the  documentation  of  participating  municipalities  (and  parts  of  municipalities)  in 
Marklund  (1981)  and  in  National  Board  of  Education  (1954-62)  (a  yearly  publication 
describing the development of the reform). With this information it is possible to code cohorts 
                                                 
30 For cohorts born until 1950 I use the 1960 census, for cohorts born 1951-1955 I use the 1965 census to assign 
their reform status.   41 
born until 1949. For later cohorts I use educational statistics on municipality level, describing 
the  number  of  pupils  in  each  grade  and  school  system  (the  old  folkskola  and  the  new 
comprehensive school) (Bureau of Educational Statistics 1960-64, Statistics Sweden 1968, 
1969). From the tables it is possible to see for which cohort the reform is implemented at 
large – that is, the first cohort where all pupils are in the new school system and there are no 
more pupils of that cohort in the old school. In most cases this is a clear-cut distinction, 
whereas in some cases the transition into the new school is gradual over two cohorts. In those 
cases, the reform applies to the majority of pupils. 
  In some cases, it has been impossible to determine the timing of the reform. A few 
municipalities  have  been  excluded  for  this  reason.  The  excluded  municipalities  are  the 
following: Södertälje, Sundbyberg, Linköping, Jönköping, Hälsingborg and Skellefteå.  
The three big cities Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö were all early implementers, 
but only in parts of the municipalities. Based on information on parish level in the 1960 and 
1965  censuses,  I  am  able  to  exclude  individuals  residing  in  parts  of  the  cities  that 
implemented before the 1943 cohort, and the remaining parts of the municipalities are coded 
according to a uniform implementation year. 
  In order to assess the reliability of the coding, I match the reform coding to the IS- 
data  (individual  statistics)  used  in  the  Meghir  and  Palme  (2005)  study  of  the  Swedish 
educational reform. The IS-data contain information on reform participation for cohorts born 
in  1948  and  1953;  the  reform  is  assigned  on  individual  level  by  information  from  the 
respective schools. The Meghir and Palme (2005) data set (available on www.aeaweb.org) 
provide information on the municipality in which the individual went to school at age 12. This 
is to be compared to the municipality of residence at age 10 to 17 in the data set used in this 
study. Assuming that municipality of residence is a good indicator for school municipality, I 
match “my” code to the Meghir and Palme data. With two independent measures of reform   42 
status, I obtain a reliability ratio of 0.94. This is a high reliability ratio and points to two facts: 
a) the quality of the coding used in this study is good and b) attenuation bias caused by 
measurement error in the reform coding should be relatively low. 
  Finally, to get an idea of the implementation of the reform, Figure A1 depicts the 
quantitative development of the reform as in the sample of this study. 
 
Figure A1 
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Appendix B 
Table B 1             




The sample used 
for estimation   
All 
The non-
restrictive sample   
  (1)    (2)   
Variable  Mean (St. Dev)    Mean (St.Dev)   
The random sample           
Child’s log income  11.85    11.86   
  (0.48)    (0.49)   
Parents’ log family income  12.12    12.12   
  (0.49)    (0.49)   
Log partner's income  11.84    11.85   
  (0.49)    (0.50)   
Reform  0.48    0.38   
  (0.50)    (0.49)   
Reform of partner  0.46    0.38   
  (0.50)    (0.49)   
Child >10 years of edu  0.75    0.74   
  (0.43)    (0.44)   
Partner >10 years of edu  0.74    0.73   
  (0.44)    (0.44)   
Child’s year of birth  1950.15    1948.99   
  (3.48)    (3.72)   
Father's year of birth  1921.88    1917.05   
  (4.66)    (7.77)   
Woman  0.50    0.50   
  (0.50)    (0.50)   
n  124996    202951   
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Table B2 
Intergenerational income elasticities 
Differences-in-differences estimates 
Results for all individuals - including also childless and single individuals 
 
       
Dependent variable  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Child’s log income  Child’s log income  Child’s log income 
       
Independent variable       
  A. All 
       
Parents’ log family income  0.178  0.178  0.227 
  (0.003)**  (0.003)**  (0.019)** 
Reform    0.000  0.152 
    (0.003)  (0.078)+ 
Reform*Family income      -0.013 
      (0.006)+ 
       
Observations  226743  226743  226743 
R-squared  0.20  0.20  0.21 
       
  B. Women 
       
Parents’ log family income  0.136  0.136  0.158 
  (0.003)**  (0.003)**  (0.018)** 
Reform    -0.001  0.139 
    (0.004)  (0.119) 
Reform*Family income      -0.011 
      (0.010) 
       
Observations  110937  110937  110937 
R-squared  0.06  0.06  0.07 
       
  C. Men     
       
Parents’ log family income  0.217  0.217  0.226 
  (0.005)**  (0.005)**  (0.028)** 
Reform    0.002  0.179 
    (0.005)  (0.121) 
Reform*Family income      -0.015 
      (0.010) 
       
Observations  115806  115806  115806 
R-squared  0.08  0.08  0.09 
       
Notes: Log income for child is a measure of permanent income; the average of log income in 1987, 1990, 1993 
and 1996. Parent’s log family income is the average of the log of family income in the years 1968, 1969 and 
1970. Family income is defined as the sum of mother’s and father’s income. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on municipality. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%.  
All estimates include child cohort effects, father cohort effects and municipality effects. In column 3 all controls 
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Table B3 
Intergenerational income elasticities 
Sibling-difference estimates 
Results for all individuals - including also childless and single individuals 
 
  (1)  (2) 
Dependent variable  Child’s log income  Child’s log income 
     
     
Independent variable     
  A. All 
     
Reform  0.002  0.142 
  (0.004)  (0.115) 
Reform*Family income    -0.012 
    (0.010) 
     
Observations  274060  274060 
R-squared  0.60  0.60 
 
  B. Women 
     
Reform  0.005  0.084 
  (0.008)  (0.214) 
Reform*Family income    -0.007 
    (0.018) 
     
Observations  81873  81873 
R-squared  0.56  0.56 
 
  C. Men 
     
Reform  -0.003  0.413 
  (0.008)  (0.215)+ 
Reform*Family income    -0.034 
    (0.018)+ 
     
Observations  89620  89620 
R-squared  0.59  0.59 
     
Notes: Log income for child is a measure of permanent income; the average of log income in 1987, 
1990, 1993 and 1996. Parent’s log family income is the average of the log of family income in the 
years 1968, 1969 and 1970. Family income is defined as the sum of mother’s and father’s income.  
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on family. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%.  
All estimates include child cohort effects, birth order effects and family fixed effects. In column 2  
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Table B4 
The effect of the reform at different quartiles of parental income 
Differences-in-differences and sibling-difference estimates 
All estimates include controls for the reform of the partner 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Independent variable  1
st quartile  2
nd quartile  3
rd quartile  4
th quartile 
       
Differences-in-differences  A. Dependent variable: Partner’s log income - all 
Reform  -0.000  0.002  -0.010  -0.005 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009) 
         
Observations  31249  31249  31249  31249 
R-squared  0.30  0.32  0.32  0.30 
         
  B. Partner’s log income - women 
Reform  -0.010  0.005  0.002  -0.012 
  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.015) 
         
Observations  15773  15773  15773  15772 
R-squared  0.08  0.09  0.08  0.08 
         
  C. Partner’s log income – men 
Reform  0.009  -0.010  -0.019  0.003 
  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.011)+  (0.011) 
         
Observations  15477  15476  15476  15476 
R-squared  0.11  0.10  0.11  0.09 
         
Sibling differences  D. Dependent variable: Partner’s log income - all 
Reform  0.001  -0.010  -0.001  0.002 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.016) 
         
Observations  27729  27726  27727  27725 
R-squared  0.62  0.62  0.63  0.65 
         
  E. Partner’s log income - women 
Reform  0.011  0.020  0.006  0.011 
  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.031) 
         
Observations  8080  8078  8080  8077 
R-squared  0.51  0.52  0.52  0.58 
         
  F. Partner’s log income – men 
Reform  -0.018  -0.029  0.012  -0.013 
  (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.028) 
         
Observations  8196  8196  8195  8195 
R-squared  0.53  0.51  0.54  0.55 
         
   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on municipality in panels A-C, on family in panels D-F. 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. All estimates include reform status of the spouse, child 
cohort effects and father cohort effects. Panels A-C include municipality fixed effects, panels E-F include family fixed 
effects. 
 